Probably depends on the preference theorists. I actually don’t have a very good sense of what others would say. My thought is that it really should, though, insofar as you think what is importang is belief states/ something you have direct epistemic access to (otherwise it starts to look like an objective list theory).
I think the appeal of the anti-experience machine position (at least for me) has to do with relations to other people. If it turned out that everyone around me were p-zombies, I'd probably be perfectly fine with entering the experience machine.
This also explains the scenario you lay out: Even if I have a very confused and weak representation of reality, I can still have the right sorts of causal relations with other people to have relations with them (I assume, otherwise I probably wouldn't prefer that option). So it tracks your intuition pump there, but still explains why you shouldn't enter the experience machine.
You could of course still have a meta-verse with other people in the future, and that might be good--but I think that's a quite different case from the experience machine.
Exactly. I would even go so far as to say, if every sentient being had easy access to the experience machine (EM), I'd probably go in. But if some didn't, there would be no way to get them to it from inside the EM, so my actions have a fundamentally different impact inside it vs outside.
Inside the EM, I could go on a virtual quest that saves everyone from suffering, but it would have no impact on any sentient being but me. In the real world, I can potentially alleviate suffering for massive numbers of sentients (inb4 shrimp welfare), even if it's way less fun/pleasant/rewarding to me.
While I think no experienced world is more real than another, I think the hedonic dimension Noah mentioned, the degree to which your preferences are fulfilled, is at the crux. My intuition is that if you ask an anti why "reality" matters to them, they would respond it is necessary for their projects. Antis think simulated worlds precude them from alleviating suffering, or wishing their friends happy holidays. So, like Silas said, the situation would be different if there are other people, and also (I differ from Jerry here) if there are forms of suffering in the meta-verse. Hence, an easy fix for antis would be the having ability to interact World-A-objects, which, if I was emulated, will still be able to do :)
Yeah, it definitely depends on ability to influence the outside world. But I would imagine the ability to influence the outside (or other) world would be greatly diminished once in. Plus, going in potentially compromises your epistemic status (even more than it already is in the "real" world) since you won't know if you're actually making the "outside" world better for others, or if your EM is just lying to you.
Thanks for the insight, and yes Sim-me would probably have a harder time hugging across the screen. I may be yapping, but If we are able to live in this World-B simulation, that would give us more reason to believe the "real" world is a simulation. I think now that without focusing which thing is "real," commensurability/rigidness across worlds matters the most. I believe antis will be convinced to plug-in, even if they could not interact with World-A-objects, if the World-B shrimp were identical to World-A shrimp in every way (replace shrimp with anything they care about). Would you plug-in if it turns out that you could reduce suffering of World-B sentients identical to World-A sentients x10 more effectively? While rigidity seems weird, antis likely accept that they themselves are rigid...
Nice! I think it’s also easy to see how we don’t care that much about *realness* per se by considering the possibility that we are in an experience machine right now. I, for one, probably wouldn’t unplug. I don’t think most people would.
Also anti-experience machine people have to accept some weird asymmetries. Like, a negative experience machine would be, in my view, equally bad to actually having those negative things happen to you. Why think something different is going on in the case of a positive experience machine?
Maybe there are things that count as goodness that aren’t just pleasure related. For one example, I personally value honesty. I don’t think it gives me pleasure necessarily. I also think this isn’t just good because I value it, but that partly why I value it because it is good. It has intrinsic value. Though, of course, I could have missed how this misses your point or where you may have addressed this already, but I didn’t see it as either of the key objections.
I love this essay. It is spot on. But along the lines of what we said above, I would only do this if partner could also do it as well. On the other hand, my life is pretty great.
Man ... I remember this one dream I had. Would love to have it again.
Do desire-satisfaction theory people think it counts if the desires are had and/or satisfied in dreams?
Probably depends on the preference theorists. I actually don’t have a very good sense of what others would say. My thought is that it really should, though, insofar as you think what is importang is belief states/ something you have direct epistemic access to (otherwise it starts to look like an objective list theory).
I think the appeal of the anti-experience machine position (at least for me) has to do with relations to other people. If it turned out that everyone around me were p-zombies, I'd probably be perfectly fine with entering the experience machine.
This also explains the scenario you lay out: Even if I have a very confused and weak representation of reality, I can still have the right sorts of causal relations with other people to have relations with them (I assume, otherwise I probably wouldn't prefer that option). So it tracks your intuition pump there, but still explains why you shouldn't enter the experience machine.
You could of course still have a meta-verse with other people in the future, and that might be good--but I think that's a quite different case from the experience machine.
Exactly. I would even go so far as to say, if every sentient being had easy access to the experience machine (EM), I'd probably go in. But if some didn't, there would be no way to get them to it from inside the EM, so my actions have a fundamentally different impact inside it vs outside.
Inside the EM, I could go on a virtual quest that saves everyone from suffering, but it would have no impact on any sentient being but me. In the real world, I can potentially alleviate suffering for massive numbers of sentients (inb4 shrimp welfare), even if it's way less fun/pleasant/rewarding to me.
While I think no experienced world is more real than another, I think the hedonic dimension Noah mentioned, the degree to which your preferences are fulfilled, is at the crux. My intuition is that if you ask an anti why "reality" matters to them, they would respond it is necessary for their projects. Antis think simulated worlds precude them from alleviating suffering, or wishing their friends happy holidays. So, like Silas said, the situation would be different if there are other people, and also (I differ from Jerry here) if there are forms of suffering in the meta-verse. Hence, an easy fix for antis would be the having ability to interact World-A-objects, which, if I was emulated, will still be able to do :)
Yeah, it definitely depends on ability to influence the outside world. But I would imagine the ability to influence the outside (or other) world would be greatly diminished once in. Plus, going in potentially compromises your epistemic status (even more than it already is in the "real" world) since you won't know if you're actually making the "outside" world better for others, or if your EM is just lying to you.
Thanks for the insight, and yes Sim-me would probably have a harder time hugging across the screen. I may be yapping, but If we are able to live in this World-B simulation, that would give us more reason to believe the "real" world is a simulation. I think now that without focusing which thing is "real," commensurability/rigidness across worlds matters the most. I believe antis will be convinced to plug-in, even if they could not interact with World-A-objects, if the World-B shrimp were identical to World-A shrimp in every way (replace shrimp with anything they care about). Would you plug-in if it turns out that you could reduce suffering of World-B sentients identical to World-A sentients x10 more effectively? While rigidity seems weird, antis likely accept that they themselves are rigid...
Nice! I think it’s also easy to see how we don’t care that much about *realness* per se by considering the possibility that we are in an experience machine right now. I, for one, probably wouldn’t unplug. I don’t think most people would.
Also anti-experience machine people have to accept some weird asymmetries. Like, a negative experience machine would be, in my view, equally bad to actually having those negative things happen to you. Why think something different is going on in the case of a positive experience machine?
72 virgins is crazy
Maybe there are things that count as goodness that aren’t just pleasure related. For one example, I personally value honesty. I don’t think it gives me pleasure necessarily. I also think this isn’t just good because I value it, but that partly why I value it because it is good. It has intrinsic value. Though, of course, I could have missed how this misses your point or where you may have addressed this already, but I didn’t see it as either of the key objections.
I love this essay. It is spot on. But along the lines of what we said above, I would only do this if partner could also do it as well. On the other hand, my life is pretty great.